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EMPLOYMENT LAW: DISPARATE TREATMENT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
POST-HICKS ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK AND ITS RECENT
APPLICATION IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Congress responded to the problem of discrimination in the work-
place through the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII").' Under Title VII, an employer may not base its employ-
ment decisions on individual employee characteristics such as race or
gender. This statutory prohibition is intended to eliminate intentional
discrimination by employers, known as disparate treatment discrimina-
tion.3 In order to accommodate the Title VII proscription against intoler-
able discrimination, the Supreme Court of the United States in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green4 implemented a tripartite procedural formula
for the courts to follow in deciding the question of whether an employer
has illegally discriminated.5 This approach is commonly referred to as the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The Court created this
framework, because direct evidence of discrimination rarely exists,
which necessitates that employees rely on circumstantial evidence to
6prove intentional discrimination.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17(1994).
2. Id. § 2000e-2. This section of the Civil Rights Acts describes unlawful practices,
stating:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
anyway which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
3. See Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment under Title VII, 87
CAL. L. REV. 983, 984 (1999).
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01.
6. See Green, supra note 3, at 985.
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The first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the
plaintiff employee to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.7 The
second stage shifts the burden to the defendant-employer to produce a
legitimate reason for it adverse employment decision.8 The third stage
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's prof-
fered reason was a pretext for discrimination.9 There are three approaches
or tests for the third stage of the burden-shifting framework. Each varies
in the amount of evidence a plaintiff must present to show the requisite
pretext. The three tests are called: the pretext-only approach, the permis-
sive pretext-only approach, and the pretext-plus approach.'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued several opinions involving
employment discrimination during the relevant survey period." These
opinions address the three-part McDonnell-Douglas framework in cases
alleging intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. All of these
cases arise under Title V11 2, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA"),'3 or the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA").
4
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's application and analysis of
the McDonnell Douglas framework, specifically the third stage of that
framework. Part I provides a general background of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Included in this background discussion is a descrip-
tion of the three tests that various courts apply at the third stage of the
framework. Part II is broken into two sections. The first section discusses
the Tenth Circuit's decisions that apply the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work at the pre-trial summary judgment stage. The second section dis-
cusses the Tenth Circuit's decisions that apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework during trial. Part III confronts the Tenth Circuit's distinction
between pre-trial and trial application of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
7. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 804-05.
10. See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
11. The survey period covers cases decided by the Tenth Circuit between September 1,
1998 and August 31, 1999.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308, 311 (1996) (stating that "[w]e have never had occasion to decide whether that application
of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that
point, we shall assume it.").
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); see Kevin W. Williams, The Reasonable
Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed
Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 98-99 (1997) (examining the




work. Finally, Part IV examines other circuits' application of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Burden Shifting Analysis in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases
The intent of Congress in enacting Title VII was not to "'guarantee a
job to every person regardless of qualifications . . .[but rather the] re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of ra-
cial or other impermissible classification.""' In McDonnell Douglas, the
Court addressed the "proper order and nature of proof' required for cases
arising under Title VII.' 6 The plaintiff was an African-American civil
rights activist who was laid off pursuant to a reduction in workforce. 7
The plaintiff protested his discharge by participating in a "stall-in,"
whereby several people parked their cars to block all of the entrances to
the facility.' 8 Approximately a year after his discharge, the plaintiff re-
sponded to an advertisement by his former employer, but McDonnell
Douglas rejected him because of his participation in the illegal protests.'9
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part
framework allocating the burden of proof in a Title VII trial. 20 First, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a "prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination."2' The Court in McDonnell Douglas suggested a plaintiff
could prove a prima facie case by showing: "(i) that he belongs to a ra-
cial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 22
The plaintiffs establishment of the prima facie case creates a pre-
sumption that the employer discriminated.23 Second, if the plaintiff
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 793-94.
17. See id. at 794.
18. See id. at 794-95. The plaintiff was arrested for his unlawful participation in the
protes. See id. at 795.
19. See id. at 796.
20. See id. at 802-05.
21. Id. at 802. The Court stated that this model is not the exclusive means by which to
prove the prima facie case because varying factual situations will require multifarious
applications of the rule. See id. at 802 n, 13.
22. Id. at 802.
23. See Green, supra note 3, at 988.
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proves the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer
"to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."24 If the defendant carries this burden, the presump-
tion raised by the plaintiff drops and the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff.25
The third and final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework re-
quires that the plaintiff prove that the reason articulated by the defendant
for its action against the plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination.26 Fed-
eral courts continue to struggle with this third part of the analysis.27
After McDonnell Douglas established the proper framework for allo-
cating burdens in a disparate treatment discrimination case based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, s the federal appellate courts struggled with respect
to deciphering the Court's holding at all stages of the McDonnell Doug-
las framework of proof.29 In turn, the Supreme Court decided a number
of cases clarifying its decision in McDonnell Douglas. The Court in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine ° reconsidered what
the Court meant at the second stage of the analysis when the burden
shifts to the defendant. 3' Asserting a violation of Title VII, the Burdine
plaintiff alleged gender discrimination following her failed promotion
and her termination.32 The Supreme Court reiterated the McDonnell
Douglas framework before addressing the issue before it.33 Turning to the
second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court noted that
the employer must produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for its action, even if that reason didn't actually motivate the
employment decision. 4 If the defendant produces such evidence, the em-
ployer has successfully rebutted the presumption raised by the prima
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This burden is only one of production and not
of proof. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (198 1).
25. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
26. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In summarizing its decision, the Court
stated that the plaintiff "must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that petitioner's
assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If
the District Judge so finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy." Id. at 807. This
suggests that a showing of pretext alone is all that the plaintiff must prove in order to succeed
once the first two steps of the analysis have been met.
27. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
28. See Williams, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. See Williams, supra note 14, at 108-09.
30. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
31. See id. at 250 (analyzing the issue of whether the defendant must prove its proffered
reason by a preponderance of the evidence).
32. See id. at 251.
33. See id. at 252-54 (stating that "the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment is not onerous" and that establishment of the prima facie case by the
plaintiff creates a presumption of discrimination by the employer).
34. Id. at 254 (observing that an employer can accomplish this through introduction of
admissible evidence which is simply a burden of production).
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facie case.35 In order to accomplish this, the employer's explanation
"must be clear and reasonably specific. 3 6
Following the decision in Burdine, the federal circuit courts have ap-
plied three different rules to the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. The third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework re-
quires that the plaintiff show the defendant's explanation for the em-
ployment decision is actually pretext for a discriminatory reason. 37 Three
separate tests developed to the meet this third stage requirement: the
pretext-only approach, the permissive pretext-only approach, and the
pretext-plus approach.
The pretext-only approach requires judgment for the plaintiff upon
demonstrating the falsity of the defendant's proffered reason. 38 The per-
missive pretext-only approach allows the plaintiff to prevail by simply
establishing pretext, so long as the evidence of pretext shows discrimi-
natory intent.39 This approach allows a jury to infer discriminatory intent
from the fact that the employer gave a false reason. Hence, the title per-
missive pretext-only applies because the jury is permitted to find for the
plaintiff on a showing of pretext alone, as long as that showing proves
intentional discrimination.
The pretext-plus approach is the most stringent. This approach re-
quires that the plaintiff not only prove the employer's proffered reason
was false but also present direct evidence of the employer's discrimina-
tory intent.
40
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,4' the Supreme Court responded
to the circuit split on how to analyze the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 42 The Court in Hicks attempted to reconcile this
discrepancy in the context of a Title VII race discrimination claim con-
cerning the firing of an African-American man.4 ' The defendants argued
that the African-American employee was fired because of disciplinary
problems and because the employee had threatened his new supervisor."
35. See id. at 255.
36. Id. at 258.
37. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
38. See Gabrielle R. Lamarche, Note, State of Employment Discrimination Cases after
Hicks, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 117-18 (1998).
39. See id. at 116-17.
40. See id. at 118-20.
41. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
42. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512 (1993) (indicating that the
law on how to conduct the pretext stage of Title VI litigation was not settled, contrary to the
suggestion of the dissent); Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
43. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504-05.
44. See id. at 505. The Court ruled that the defendants had met their burden of production
under McDonnell Douglas which placed them in a "better position than if they had remained
silent." Id. at 509 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, no credibility assessment occurs
2000]
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The district court declared that the reasons offered by the defendants
for the actions against the plaintiff was false. Nevertheless, the court held
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants' true motivation were
discriminatory and the district court entered judgment for the defendant.
45 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the correct test was the
pretext-only approach, which, when applied here, required judgment for
the plaintiff, as he had established that the proffered reasons were pre-
textual.46
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' application of the
pretext-only test.47 The Hicks Court adopted the permissive pretext-only
approach and held a jury "may infer discrimination from circumstantial
evidence alone., 48 The Court stated that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of
the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is ac-
companied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements
of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." '49 The
Court based its decision on Federal Rule of Evidence 301 and precedent
that the burden of proof never shifts and that plaintiff retains the "'ulti-
mate burden of persuasion." 0 However, the ambiguous language in the
Hicks decision has resulted in some circuits following the permissive
pretext-only approach with others adhering to the pretext-plus
approach."
The dissent in Hicks warned about the ramifications of eliminating
the pretext-only approach. 2 Justice Souter decried the majority opinion
for creating an incentive for employers to lie when defending disparate
treatment claims.53 The dissenting justices noted that the McDonnell
Douglas framework was implemented in order to give the defendant an
opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs offering of proof of discrimina-
tion and to allow the defendant to limit the focus of the investigation as it
saw fit.5 4 Under the new pronouncement, Justice Souter recognized that
when deciding whether the defendant met the burden of production at the second stage of the
analysis. See id.
45. See id. at 508 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
46. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. (declining to require a further showing that the adverse
employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus).
47. See id. at 519; see also Lamarche, supra note 38, at 121 (stating that "[alithough
Hicks contains ambiguities, the Court clearly rejected the strict 'pretext-only' approach").
48. Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
49. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
50. Id. (internal citations omitted).
51. See Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
52. See Hicks, 509 U.S at 533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that not requiring
judgment for the plaintiff upon establishing pretext alone will "be unfair to plaintiffs,
unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present false evidence in
court").
53. See id. at 538-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 536-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the courts would be able to "look beyond the employer's lie by assuming
the possible existence of other reasons the employer might have prof-
fered without lying."5
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the pretext-only strand of
analysis, several courts, including the Tenth Circuit, cling to this rejected
approach for assessing whether a plaintiff can survive a defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 6 Most of the circuits, however, apply the
permissive pretext-only approach, which permits, but does not require,
the fact finder to infer discriminatory animus from the plaintiff proving a
prima facie case and successfully rebutting the defendant's reasons for
its action. Nonetheless, a small portion of the circuits rely on the pretext-
plus approach and require a finding of discriminatory intent by the fact
finder in addition to mere falsity of the defendant's stated reason. The
Supreme Court's rejection of the pretext-only approach in Hicks failed to
resolve the circuit split.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Application of the McDonnell Douglas Frame-
work
Prior to Hicks, the Tenth Circuit followed the majority of federal cir-
cuits and applied the pretext-plus approach, whereby the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant-employer's proffered reason was a pretext
for intentional discrimination, not simply that it was false.57 Articulated
another way, the pretext-plus approach utilized by the Tenth Circuit re-
quired the plaintiff to prove not only that the employer's proffered ex-
planations for its action were "not worthy of credence," but also that the
employer's true motive violated Title VII.5' After the Supreme Court
decided Hicks, the Tenth Circuit struggled with whether the pretext-only,
permissive pretext-only, or pretext-plus approach applied at the various
stages of a trial.59
In Randle v. City of Aurora,6° the Tenth Circuit clarified this confu-
sion adhering to the pretext-only approach in the context of summary
55. Id. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The plaintiff
must show not merely that the proffered reasons are pretextual but that they are 'a pretext for
discrimination."' (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981))).
58. See Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on
Furnco Constr. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (decided two months prior to Hicks).
59. See Jones v. Babbitt, 52 F.3d 279, 281 (10th Cir. 1995) (altering the formulation of
the pretext-plus approach slightly to require the plaintiff to prove that the employer's "reason
was merely a pretext for unlawful reprisal and that [the employer] intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff"); see also Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 530 (10th Cir. 1995)
(demanding that the court consider all of the evidence and decide whether the employer
impermissibly and intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff).
60. 69 F.3d 441 (10th Cir. 1995).
2000] 489
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judgment and the permissive pretext-only approach at a full trial.6' The
decision noted that proving pretext permits the jury to infer discrimina-
tory animus, but does not require a finding of discriminatory intent
against the defendant and consequent judgment for the plaintiff.62 The
Randle court altered this generally applicable rule at the summary judg-
ment stage, simply requiring the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case and
pretext to defeat a defendant's summary judgment motion.63 Thus, the
inquiry into pretext at the summary judgment phase requires the plaintiff
to show that the defendant's proffered reason is "unworthy of credence"
in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact and withstand the mo-
tion.64
II. TENTH CIRCUIT CASES:
The Tenth Circuit decided six cases during the survey period that
analyzed the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Most of
these applied the McDonnell Douglas framework at the pre-trial, sum-
mary judgment stage. Only one case came to the Tenth Circuit after a full
trial. Although the standard the Tenth Circuit applied remained consis-
tent with Randle v. City of Aurora, the actual articulation and adherence
to that precedent varies.
A. Cases Decided On Summary Judgment
1. Trujillo v. University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
65
a. Facts
The Hispanic plaintiff in Trujillo charged the defendant-employer
with discrimination arising under Title VII, claiming hostile work envi-
ronment, disparate treatment, and retaliation.66 The district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. 67 The de-
fendant-employer suffered from budgetary difficulties and recommended
the elimination of the plaintiffs position. 68 The employer did not dis-
charge the plaintiff immediately because "his position was funded for the
next year through a one time $30,000 grant .... 69 After that year passed
61. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,453 n.18 (10th Cir. 1995).
62. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 451-52 n. 15.
63. See id. at 451.
64. Id. at 452 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
65. 157 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 1998).
66. See Trujillo v. University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, 157 F.3d 1211, 1213
(10th Cir. 1998).
67. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1213. For the purposes of this survey, the discussion will be
limited to the court's analysis of the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1213-14.
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and the grant ran out, the defendant discharged the plaintiff.0 The district
court found the defendant discharged the plaintiff because of budget
cuts.7 Although the plaintiff proved his initial burden under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework by establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination, the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to showing that the defendant's reason for discharging
him was pretextual
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit relied on Randle and held that summary judgment
must be granted in favor of the defendant unless the plaintiff establishes
that the defendant's legitimate reason for its employment decision was
both illegitimate and false. 3 In upholding the district court's granting of
summary judgment,74 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the employer of-
fered a legitimate reason for the discharge and the plaintiff failed to raise
an issue of fact tending to show that the reason was "pretextual and un-
worthy of belief.,
75
2. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Services76
a. Facts
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the plaintiff's
Title VII racial discrimination claim due to an insufficient showing of
pretext. 77 The plaintiff, an African-American, applied for a promotion to
the position of Fire and Safety Officer.8 The hospital gave the job to a
white applicant.79 The plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII, but eventu-
ally the parties settled.8° As part of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff
was promoted to the position for which he originally applied.8 Soon after
the plaintiffs promotion, the defendant-employer posted a job an-
nouncement for Fire and Safety Officer Supervisor and stated in the an-
nouncement that applicants with supervisory experience would be given
70. See id. at 1214.
71. See id. at 1213-14.
72. See id. at 1215.
73. See id. (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 n.14 (10th Cir. 1995)).
74. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1217.
75. Id. at 1215 (citing Randle, 69 F.3d at 451).
76. 165 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999),
77. See Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff also brought charges of retaliatory
discrimination. See id. at 1325. Analysis of these claims is beyond the scope of this survey.
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preference." The plaintiff applied and interviewed for the position, but
the hospital filled the position with a white employee. 3 The white em-
ployee received the highest scores in the first round of interviews and
had significantly more supervisory experience.84 The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to the
disparate treatment claim. 5
b. Decision
Proceeding through the three-part McDonnell Douglas framework,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the third part. Specifically,
the plaintiff failed to establish that a "reasonable jury [could] conclude
that defendant's proffered reasons for failing to promote [the plaintiff
were] 'unworthy of belief."'8 6 One of the primary attempts by the plain-
tiff to establish pretext included establishing procedural irregularities in
the promotional decision. 7 Although the plaintiff attempted to establish
pretext, his evidence did not sufficiently show that the defendant's rea-
sons were false. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant.8
3. Butler v. City of Prairie Village 9
a. Facts
The plaintiff brought a disparate treatment discrimination suit under
the ADA," which required application of the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting framework. 9' The plaintiff worked as an assistant director for
the city's Public Works Department and became clinically depressed
after working in that position for approximately six years.92 After the
onset of depression, the plaintiff s productivity decreased.93 The plaintiff
subsequently received several poor performance evaluations and had
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. The white employee's supervisory experience was in another field. See id. at
1324. But the court did not consider this a material distinction when evaluating the lesser
experience of the plaintiff. See id. at 1328.
85. See id. at 1325.
86. Id. at 1328-29 (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 (10th Cir. 1995)).
87. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329.
88. See id.
89. 172 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 1999).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213.
91. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 747 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that
claims arising under the ADA, and based on indirect evidence, are evaluated under this
framework).
92. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 740-41.
93. See id. at 741-42. The plaintiffs psychologist indicated that the plaintiff should not
work more than forty hours a week for fear that the added stress would further decrease his
productivity. See id. at 741.
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confrontations with the plaintiffs supervisors.94 Pursuant to a reorgani-
zation plan, the plaintiffs supervisor eliminated his position with the
department.9 After the reorganization, the employer created a new posi-
tion, which had many of the same responsibilities as the plaintiffs old
job.96 The plaintiff failed to overcome defendant's motion for summary
judgment, because he failed to prove a prima facie case, the first part of
the McDonnell Douglas framework.97
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, holding that the plaintiff
successfully proved the prima facie case.9 The court then turned its at-
tention to the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work.9 In order to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must raise
only a genuine issue of fact that the defendant's proffered reason was a
pretext for discriminatory motives.' °° The court indicated that the defen-
dant proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing the plain-
tiff by showing that it reorganized the department in which the plaintiff
worked.' °' However, the court found that the plaintiff successfully coun-
tered this reason, by showing that the reason was pretextual, as evi-
denced by a new position being created shortly after the plaintiff's termi-
nation entailing duties similar to those of the plaintiff's former
position.' 2 Because the plaintiff established an issue of fact concerning
the pretextual nature of the defendant's proffered reason, the court held
summary judgment for the defendant was improper.' 3
94. See id. at 742.
95. See id. at 743.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 748 ("The district court found that Plaintiff 'fail[ed] to point to any
evidence indicating that Defendant ... terminated him due to his alleged disability."' (quoting
Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 974 F. Supp. 1386, 1401 (D. Kan. 1997))).
98. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 749 (finding an inference of discrimination in the facts that
plaintiffs evaluations declined after disclosing his disability and in an increase in comments by
supervisors about the plaintiffs work productivity after the plaintiff asked for accommodation
for his disability).
99. See id. at 750 (assessing whether the defendant offered a reason for the adverse action
and whether the plaintiff established pretext).
100. See id. (observing that the plaintiff does not need to prove that discriminatory animus
actually motivated the decision to terminate in order to avoid summary judgment (citing
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 1997)).
101. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 750.
102. See id. at 750-51 (discussing how the apparent minimal differences in criteria
between the plaintiffs old position and the newly established Project Coordinator position
create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext).
103. See id. at 751.
2000]
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4. Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd.'°"
a. Facts
In Hardy, the plaintiff claimed that his employer violated the ADA
and ADEA by terminating him because of his heart condition and age.'0 5
The employer claimed the termination was prompted by the plaintiff's
sexually harassing conduct.' ° According to the trial record, the plaintiff,
a male and longtime employee of the company, harassed female employ-
ees even after the company instituted diversity training sessions "to ad-
dress issues of women and minorities in the workplace . ,.0' The com-
pany fired the plaintiff after an internal investigation of several reported
incidents.' ° The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove that the employer's reason
for termination was pretextual.' °9
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to de-
termine whether the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence to prove
pretext, thereby reversing the lower court's grant of summary
judgment."0 As proof of the pretextual nature of the employer's proffered
reason for termination, the plaintiff offered evidence that the employer's
explanations were contradictory, the investigation of his harassing con-
duct was poorly conducted, and younger employees were treated more
favorably for similar indiscretions."' The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the
plaintiffs pretextual characterizations," 2 and held that summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant was appropriate."'
104. 185 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. See Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1999). When
the plaintiff was fired, he was sixty years old, had undergone heart bypass surgery, and had
suffered a heart attack. See id. at 1079.
106. See id. at 1078.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1078-79 (the plaintiff received a letter explaining the reason for his
termination; at the time the letter was sent, the company knew the plaintiffs age and heart
condition).
109. See id. at 1080 (basing its decision in part on an assumption that the plaintiff
established a prima facie case of discrimination).
110. See id. at 1079-80 (stating that direct evidence is not necessary to establish pretext
and that a plaintiff withstands summary judgment by showing that the employer's proffered
reason was unworthy of credence).
11l. Seeid. at 1080.
112. See id. at 1081-83 (holding that the employer's explanations were not contradictory
because they centered upon the plaintiffs treatment of female co-workers, the investigation of
the alleged incidents were properly conducted, and a similar allegation against a younger male
employee occurred prior to the allegations against the plaintiff, and had prompted the
company's more serious policy against harassment in the workplace).
113. See id. at 1083.
[Vol. 77:3
EMPLOYMENT LAW
5. Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc."4
a. Facts
The final summary judgment case addressed by the Tenth Circuit
during the survey period involved a plaintiff claiming gender discrimi-
nation under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA. Both
accusations were prompted by the defendant's failure to hire the plaintiff
on three separate occasions for the same position."' The plaintiff was a
female over forty years of age who had been denied a position as a pilot
three times."16 The company's application process for pilots placed males
and females in two categories of consideration once candidates met pre-
liminary requirements, and the defendant then selected a proportionate
number of applicants from each category."7 From this pool, the review
board conducted flight simulations and formal interviews which deter-
mined who received conditional offers.' 1 8 Because the plaintiff received
unsatisfactory scores on each of her three interviews, the company re-
fused to promote her to the position of line pilot." 9 The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's
claim of disparate treatment, because the plaintiff "failed to establish a
prima facie case of age or sex discrimination....2 Thus, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, because she failed




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the decision to grant
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework.' 22 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a
genuine issue of fact as to "whether [defendant's] reasons for not hiring
her were pretextual."'23 The court found that the plaintiff's subjective
opinion as to her qualifications for the position was irrelevant to estab-
114. 186F.3d 1301 (10thCir. 1999).
115. See Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999). The
plaintiff also alleged retaliatory discrimination, but this discussion will not address that part of
the opinion. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1308-09 (the company justified the categories based on its belief that
females generally have less aeronautical experience than males).
118. See id. at 1309.
119. See id.
120. Id. (stating that the district court also granted the company's motion to dismiss for the
plaintiff's initial rejection from the position, because they were time barred).
121. Seeid.at 1316.
122. See id. (focusing on the second and third stages of the of the framework, as the court
of appeals found that the plaintiff proved the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework
by presenting a printafacie case).
123. Id. at 1317.
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lishing a dispute of material fact.'24 Furthermore, the plaintiff did not
show that comparison with other applicants demonstrated an over-
whelming discrepancy between their qualifications.'25 The court decided
summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to pro-
duce sufficient evidence that sex or age discrimination motivated the
employer not to hire the plaintiff.' 26
B. Case Decided After A Full Trial
1. Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc. 7
a. Facts
In Anaeme, the plaintiff alleged disparate treatment discrimination
based on race arising under Title VII, because the defendant-employer
refused to hire him after he submitted sixty employment applications.'28
The defendant's asserted that it had no record of the plaintiff ever having
applied for a position.129 In rebuttal, the plaintiff presented four letters
sent to him by the defendant indicating that they had received his appli-
cations.'3° After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, the
district court denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim, which asserted that the




The court of appeals applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework according to the Tenth Circuit's application of that formula.'32
Specifically, first the plaintiff must prove the prima facie case by estab-
lishing that "(1) he applied for an available position; (2) he was qualified
for the position; and (3) he 'was rejected under circumstances which give
124. See id. at 1317 n.13.
125. See id. at 1318-19 ("[P]retext cannot be shown simply by identifying minor
differences between plaintiffs qualifications and those of successful applicants.") (referring to
Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1993)).
126. See Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1320.
127. 164 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
128. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff
also raised several other discrimination claims aside from the disparate treatment claim. See id.
These claims are not addressed here, as they are beyond the scope of this survey.
129. See id. at 1278.
130. See id. at 1282.
131. Id. at 1277-78.
132. See id. at 1278. The court noted that the plaintiff implemented the framework because
he had no direct evidence of intentional discrimination. See id.
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rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.""33 Second, the defendant
must rebut the prima facie case by proffering a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for not hiring the plaintiff.'34 Finally, the plaintiff must
convince the jury that the proffered reason was pretextual for unlawful
discrimination and that the failure to hire him was actually "motivated by
racial discrimination."'35 Once every step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is fulfilled, the overarching question remains whether the
employer's decision not to hire the plaintiff was discriminatory. This
final question is one of fact for the jury.'
3 6
Applying the framework to the present case, the court explained that
the defendant's burden at the second stage is only one of production and
that the employer need not persuade the trier of fact that the alleged non-
discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff actually motivated the
decision.'37 The court held that the defendant met its burden of produc-
tion by articulating the only possible reason for failing to hire the plain-
tiff, namely a lack of knowledge that the plaintiff had applied for job
with the company.'38 Because the defendant stated it had no recollection
of the plaintiff ever applying for a position, 39 the employer proffered the
only available reason to explain that its decision was not based on unlaw-
ful factors.' 40
The plaintiff attempted to contradict the defendant's proffered reason
by suggesting that four letters he received from the defendant acknowl-
edged his application and therefore constituted pretext.' 4' The court ruled
that "[p]laintiff s attack on the credibility of the proffered explanation
does not mean either that the explanation fails to raise a genuine issue of
fact or that a judgment for him is required."'4 2 Simply because the defen-
dant's explanation "'is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived,
'"1 43
that does not equate to validating the claim that race was the basis for the
133. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)) (noting that establishment of the prima facie case creates a presumption of illegal
discrimination by the employer).
134. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1278 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
135. Id. at 1278-79.
136. See id. at 1279 (quoting Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 530 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir. 1991))).
137. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1278.
138. See id. at 1280.
139. See id. ("Defendants surmised that they had no record of Plaintiffs applications
because (1) he never applied, (2) his applications were lost or discarded by the personnel
department, or (3) his applications were rejected because of facial deficiencies.").
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1282.
142. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1282 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504
(1993)).
143. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524).
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failure to hire him.'" On the issue of the credibility of the defendant's
proffered reason, the court held that district court did not err in not
granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, because
the jury was free to determine that race was not the real reason for the
failure to hire.' 45 In sum, the defendant met its burden of producing a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, shifting
the burden back to the plaintiff. '46 Because the plaintiff failed to meet its




The Tenth Circuit applied the pretext-plus approach at the time the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Hicks but struggled with the
proper approach to apply following Hicks.'48 The Circuit steadied itself in
Randle v. City of Aurora, by allowing a plaintiff to survive summary
judgment by demonstrating that the defendant's proffered reason was
false. '4 9 Accordingly, a jury may infer discriminatory intent from a
showing of pretext alone, which equates to the pretext standard known as
permissive pretext-only. Since abandoning the pretext-plus approach,'50
the Tenth Circuit's application of the McDonnell Douglas framework at
the third stage of analysis has remained fairly consistent.
The recent cases involving summary judgment demonstrate that the
Tenth Circuit's analysis of the third stage is not consistent with prece-
dent. Instead, it imposes a more stringent burden on the plaintiff than
precedent warrants. The test applied to the third stage at a full trial re-
mains consistent with precedent but creates perverse incentives for em-
ployers to lie about their motives for firing or failing to hire someone.
Despite the impropriety of such an incentive, reasonable business needs
mitigate in favor of a higher standard for the plaintiff at this final stage.
When deciding a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
Tenth Circuit typically applies the pretext-only approach and requires a
simple showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's proffered reason was
144. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1283 (stating that plaintiff must persuade the jury that race
was the actual reason for the adverse employment action).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1279.
147. See id. at 1283.
148. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (abandoning the requirement that, in
order to survive a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must also establish that
discriminatory animus actually motivated the defendant's adverse employment action).
150. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text..
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pretextual or unworthy of belief. 5' Although the Tenth Circuit follows
this rule generally, it retreated from applying a hard-line rule regarding
the establishment of pretext in order to survive the defendant-employer's
motion for summary judgment.'52 This application runs counter to the
Tenth Circuit's established precedent, which allows evidence of pretext
alone to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment.'53
Part of the confusion stems from the procedural posture encountered
in the Supreme Court cases. The McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and
Hicks decisions arose out of a full trial,S4 whereas district courts rou-
tinely grant summary judgment motions, which necessitate that the Tenth
Circuit state some standard for appeal.' S' Despite apparently contradic-
tory application, once a disparate treatment case proceeds to a full trial,
the permissive pretext-only test applies, and the ultimate burden rests
with the plaintiff to prove discriminatory animus, which may or may not
be shown by demonstrating pretext.1
56
Justice Souter's concerns articulated in the Hicks dissent ring true
when the case proceeds to trial, and the court requires the more stringent
permissive pretext-only test. A recent example from the Tenth Circuit
shows how easily a defendant can proffer a "legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason" for its adverse employment action under the Hicks
analysis. 57 In Anaeme, the defendant successfully defended a Title VII
claim by a job applicant. 58 When a defendant-employer is under fire by
an applicant, Anaeme legitimates a proffered reason by the employer that
it has no record of the plaintiff ever applying for the position.,59 In effect,
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anaeme gives employers a license to con-
151. See Trujillo v. University of Colo. Health Science Ctr., 157 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th
Cir. 1998); Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Serv., 165
F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 750 (10th Cir.
1999); Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999).
152. See Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1320 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to
produce sufficient evidence that discrimination actually motivated the employer, not simply by
establishing the falsity of the defendant's proffered reason). But see Butler v. City of Prairie
Village, 172 F.3d 736, 750 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff does not have to show that
the defendant was motivated by discrimination in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment).
153. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
154. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505 (1993); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 797 (1973).
155. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1215; Simms, 165 F.3d at 1328; Butler, 172 F.3d at 750;
Hardy, 185 F.3d at 1080.
156. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Hicks,
509 U.S. at 509); accord, Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 n.15 (10th Cir. 1995).
157. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1283.
158. See id. (stating that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant was motivated
by discriminatory animus based on race).
159. See id. at 1279-80.
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veniently misplace the paperwork of undesirable applicants and not be
punished for otherwise discriminatory conduct." Such a license allows
employers to lie about their true motivations in order to prevail at trial.
Others have voiced Justice Souter's concerns since the Court an-
nounced its decision in Hicks. 161 One scholar, Stephen Plass, observed
that the Court typically frowns on lying, but that the Hicks approach ac-
tually rewards such behavior.' 62 Plass asserts that Title VII is less effec-
tive because the Court granted employers permission to lie.'63 He analo-
gizes this situation to a criminal setting, wherein defendants may not
rebut the prosecution's prima facie case with lies without risking a per-
jury charge.' 6' Applying criminal perjury jurisprudence to Title VII cases
would be one way to return truthfulness to disparate treatment
litigation.' 65 Minimally, the Court should interject the rules for identify-
ing perjury into Title VII jurisprudence, which would diminish the harm-
ful effects of the defendant's lies.166
Although Anaeme may present an incentive for an employer to lie,
courts have good reasons for allowing such behavior. The Supreme
Court has noted that an employer cannot reasonably be expected to keep
personnel records on applicants who never actually become personnel.'
67
This policy recognizes the need for businesses to maintain certain effi-
ciencies which storing records of each firing and hiring decision would
defeat. Despite this policy, employers have a strong motivation to keep
records of its employment decisions.
One of the more effective means for an employer to avoid problems
with discrimination suits is to maintain a paper trail, detailing employ-
160. This assertion rests on the assumption that the plaintiff will be unable to adduce
evidence to prove discriminatory motivation. See id. at 1283 (producing four letters from the
employer that it had received plaintiffs applications was insufficient to prove unlawful
motivation).
161. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 539-40 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the majority's "scheme" because employers will benefit from lying and,
in some instances, must lie in order to win a discrimination suit); Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost
Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 599-602 (1998) (stating that the
Court's decision in Hicks rewards employers who fabricate a lie in order to rebut a plaintiff's
prima facie case, and, as a result, Title VII has lost its effectiveness at curbing employment
discrimination).
162. See Plass, supra note 161, at 599.
163. See Plass, supra note 161, at 602.
164. See Plass, supra note 161, at 610.
165. See Plass, supra note 161, at 609-10.
166. See Plass, supra note 161, at 614-15.
167. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 n.5 (1993) (observing that
such a notion that employers may maintain such records is "highly fanciful," and that such
practices would be detrimental to businesses).
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ment decisions. 6 8 This paper trail would indicate legitimate reasons why
the employer refused to hire an applicant or fired an employee. In addi-
tion, a paper trail can be "sanitized" which entails removing documents
once state and federal statutes no longer require the employer to maintain
them. 69 Through a properly maintained employment record, an employer
can establish an evidentiary record that shows reliance on permissible
factors in making its employment decisions. This evidence bolsters the
employer's legitimate reason for the adverse employment action and
works against any attempted showing of pretext by the plaintiff.
District courts do not sit to act as "super personnel departments" able
to determine employment criteria which are not based on impermissible
characteristics."' As a result, a certain amount of lying and fabrication
may spring forth because of a policy favoring the autonomy of busi-
nesses to make their own employment decisions.
Another variable to consider is the effect of permitting pretext alone
to wrongfully punish an employer. In a disparate treatment case, a plain-
tiff may be able to produce sufficient evidence that a defendant's em-
ployment decision was false, although discrimination did not motivate
the decision. A decision to fire an employee may be based on a desire to
evade litigation because of other illegal or unsavory conduct.7 2 Because
an employer does not want to reveal illegal or unsavory activity that ac-
tually motivated the employment determination, an inference of dis-
criminatory animus is not warranted simply because a cover-up explana-
tion was proven false. Such a finding actually undermines a claim that




Most of the circuits follow the permissive pretext-only approach,
74
which permits a finding of discrimination after the plaintiff demonstrates
168. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 988-92 (1999).
169. See id. at 993 (quoting GERALD S. HARTMAN ET AL, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
RELATED LITIGATION ISSUES 358 (1994)).
170. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 168, at 992-93. This suggestion does not imply that the
employer should sanitize its records once litigation begins because of a potential contempt
action.
171. Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Ctr., 165 F.3d
1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999)).
172. See Widoe v. District No. 111, 147 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Rothmeier v.
Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1338 (8th Cir. 1996)).
173. See Widoe, 147 F.3d at 731.
174. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 452 n.16 (10th Cir. 1995) (indicating that
the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply the
permissive pretext-only approach). However, closer readings of the opinions reveal
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the prima facie case and that the defendant's proffered reason is false.'
Several examples from different circuits illustrate this. The Third Circuit
in Sheridan v. E.L. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 17 6 announced its adherence
to the permissive pretext-only approach.7 7 That Circuit explicitly rejected
the pretext-plus approach,17 1 where additional evidence of the employer's
discriminatory motive beyond mere pretext is required in order for the
plaintiff to prevail. 79 The Eleventh Circuit in Schoenfeld v. Babbitt °
decided a reverse discrimination case where a male plaintiff alleged race
and gender discrimination under Title VII because the employer failed to
hire him.'"' Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant's gender discrimination claim, 82 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit applied the permissive pretext-only approach. 3 Under the Eleventh
Circuit's reading of the pretext-only approach, a plaintiff may withstand
a motion for summary judgment simply by proving that the defendant's
reason for not hiring was false. 84 Several other circuits follow this ap-




Some circuits slightly modify the permissive pretext-only approach,
which distinguishes between the trial stage and the summary judgment
stage of discrimination proceedings. 86 In these circuits, once the burden
contradictions in the Tenth Circuit's rendering of which circuits apply the permissive pretext-
only approach. See infra notes 184-192.
175. See, e.g., Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating
that "once a plaintiff has disproved the reasons offered by the defendant, the factfinder is
permitted to infer discrimination. A plaintiff does not need to introduce additional evidence of
discrimination to prevail on the merits. Once a plaintiff establishes its prima facie case, this,
along with disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons for the negative employment action,
will permit a finding of discrimination by the factfinder").
176. 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996).
177. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPot de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67(3d Cir. 1996)
(interpreting Hicks to mean that a showing of the prima facie case and that the defendant's
proffered explanation was unbelievable permitted the jury to infer intentional discrimination,
although such a finding was not required).
178. See id. at 1067.
179. See id. at 1071 (noting how the district court erred by requiring such additional
evidence).
180. 168 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 1999).
181. See Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11 th Cir. 1999)
182. See id. at 1271.
183. See id. at 1269. The court stated that a plaintiff "may show pretext" by presenting
sufficient evidence of the falsity of the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason. Id.
(emphasis added).
184. See id. (quoting Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir.
1997)).
185. See Keathley v. Ameritech Corp., 187 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 1999); Kline v.
Tennesse Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1997).
186. See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 458 (7th Cir. 1999); Randle v.
City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 (10th Cir. 1995); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1993).
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shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason proffered by the defen-
dant was a pretext for discrimination, evidence of false reasoning, in ad-
dition to the established prima facie case, creates a per se issue of fact
that defeats the defendant's motion for summary judgment.' 7 These cir-
cuits permit a finding of discrimination at the trial stage based on pretext
alone, but the showing of pretext must persuade the fact finder that the
defendant's action was intentionally discriminatory.' 8
Several circuits continue to operate under the rubric of pretext-plus.'8 9
The Fourth Circuit in Gillins v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc.'9°
provides the clearest description of what "pretext-plus" means. Accord-
ing to Gillins, simply showing the falsity of the defendants proffered
reason does not necessarily defeat the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.' 9' The court notes that the plaintiff must present sufficient evi-
dence that would warrant the jury to find discrimination as the defen-
dant's actual motive.' 92 Although the other two circuits retaining this ap-
proach are slightly less explicit than the Fourth Circuit, they articulate
much the same standard at the pretext stage of analysis.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari'9' in an age discrimi-
nation case emanating from the termination of a 57-year-old employee
who worked for the company for 40 years.' 94 The employer terminated
the plaintiff after he failed to accurately report employee absenteeism
and poor production occurring under his supervision. '9' The plaintiff al-
leged that comments made by his superiors about his age established
sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination on the part of the
employer to support his claim.'96 In reversing the district court's denial of
the defendant's post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law, '9'
the Fifth Circuit analyzed the case under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
187. See, e.g., Washington, 10 F.3d at 1433 (stating that "there will always be a question
for the factfinder once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine issue as to
whether the employer's explanation for its action is true. Such a question cannot be resolved on
summary judgment").
188. See id. (requiring no additional evidence of discrimination at trial once pretext is
proven).
189. See, e.g., Kerzer v. Kingley Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1998); Gillins v.
Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1998); Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141
F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1998).
190. See Gillins, 148 F.3d 413.
191 See id. at 417 (explaining the minimal effect of proving mere pretext on a defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
192. See id.
193. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 444 (1999).
194. See Reeves, 197 F.3d at 690.
195. See id. at 690-91.
196. See id. at 691 (claiming that the comments "he 'must have come over on the
Mayflower,' and . . . that he was 'too damn old to do the job"' proved that discrimination
motivated the employer).
197. See id. at 690.
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work."' The appeal centered on whether the plaintiff had established
pretext under the third prong of the framework.'99 The court ruled that the
plaintiff must prove the employer's stated reason was false and that age
discrimination motivated the decision to terminate the plaintiff.2 0 Be-
cause the plaintiff s supervisor did not make the comments in the context
of his termination and multiple individuals recommended firing him, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence of dis-
criminatory intent to support a claim of age discrimination. 20
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the pretext-plus approach at the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework prompted the Supreme
Court to hear the case. After the Court addresses Reeves, a more defini-
tive rule will likely guide the circuits on how to apply the pretext stage. 2
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's approach to pretext analysis may
change once the Supreme Court announces its decision in Reeves.
CONCLUSION
The broad prohibition against employment discrimination under Title
VII and other related Acts gave rise to a mechanism that organizes the
presentation of circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases. The
Supreme Court declared a tripartite framework in McDonnell Douglas,
Inc. v. Green, which was further clarified in Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. The
Hicks decision eliminated the pretext-only approach at the third stage of
the procedural framework, and the Court apparently sided with the per-
missive pretext-only test. The Court did not clearly articulate this mes-
sage, and as a result, the circuits remain divided on which model to fol-
low.
198. See id. at 691-92.
199. See id. at 692.
200. See id. (indicating that age-related comments may show discriminatory intent when
they are: "(1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an individual with authority
over the challenged employment decision; and (3) related to that employment decision"). This
approach resembles the pretext-plus approach to the third part of the procedural framework.
201. See id. at 693-94. The court also noted that twenty of the management personnel were
over fifty years old, implying that those of similar age to the plaintiff could not have
discriminated against him because of his age. See id.
202. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). This case was
decided in the final stages of the publishing process of this article. The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals and held that "[a] plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination . . .
combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability
for intentional discrimination under the ADEA." This decision is noteworthy as it implicates
that the burden of proof is lower than previously interpreted. No additional evidence needs to be
presented to infer from the defendant's false proffered reason for discrimination that said
discrimination was intentional. This decision will undoubtedly affect how the circuits address
pretet in discrimination cases.
[Vol. 77:3
EMPLOYMENT LAW
The Tenth Circuit adheres to the majority view of permissive pretext-
only whereby the fact finder is permitted to infer discrimination upon a
showing that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. This estab-
lishment of pretext must persuade the jury that the decision was actually
motivated by discrimination, although a plaintiff will survive summary
judgment by proving only the falsity of the defendants stated reasons.
However, the continued viability of the pretext-only approach at the
summary judgment phase was called into question by the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc.
The current state of the McDonnell Douglas framework has been
subjected to harsh criticism. One objection leveled against the Court's
approach to the pretext stage is that it creates perverse incentives that
encourage employers to lie in order to defend against allegations of dis-
crimination. The current application of that standard actually allows an
employer to prevail based on a fabrication of its reason for acting against
a protected person, as long as the plaintiff cannot establish the invalidity
of the fabrication. Although creation of such incentives may not be wise,
other countervailing interests require that such a system remain in place,
specifically: (1) maintaining business efficiencies; (2) allowing busi-
nesses to remain relatively autonomous; and (3) recognizing that other
reasons may exist which an employer would rather keep secret.
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